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By Peter Finn
Tuesday, December 11, 2001; Page A01
LANDSTUHL, Germany -- They went in at
night in mid-October, 11 members of the U.S. Army 5th Special Forces
Group, dropped into a valley deep inside Taliban territory in central
Afghanistan. This austere, wild gash in the earth, the soldiers remarked
to one another, looked like "the back side of the moon."
Out of the darkness stepped Hamid Karzai,
today about to be interim leader of Afghanistan, then merely the head of a
modest militia force that the United States hoped could galvanize the
Pashtun tribes of southern Afghanistan against the Taliban authorities.
Over the next six weeks, the small and
isolated American unit would fight alongside the ever-growing force of
Karzai, calling in airstrikes and firing weapons to repel a fierce Taliban
counterattack. It would negotiate with tribal leaders and advance with its
Afghan allies to within 20 miles of Kandahar, the Taliban's last major
stronghold.
"My focus was taking Kandahar, that
they'd surrender to us," recounted Capt. Jason Amerine, the unit's
commander. "Taking Kandahar, as I saw it, was probably going to be
the end of the war."
Kandahar fell last week, but Amerine was
not there to see it happen. His unit's mission was cut short on Wednesday
when an errant U.S. bomb killed three Americans and five of their Afghan
allies, and wounded about 40 other Americans and Afghans, Amerine among
them.
The tall, lean West Point graduate is now
recuperating from shrapnel wounds in a U.S. military hospital in Germany.
With another wounded member of his team, Staff Sgt. Brad Fowers, 24, he
provided in a two-hour interview the most in-depth account to date of what
U.S. Special Forces have done out of sight on the ground since the U.S.
bombing campaign began Oct. 7. He declined to reveal key operational
details.
Amerine, who is scheduled to fly home in
the next few days, said he wants the men who lost their lives that day to
be honored as well as mourned. "I don't want them to be remembered
for how they died, but what they did beforehand," he said.
The 5th Special Forces Group, based at
Fort Campbell, Ky., had been in a Central Asian country for nearly six
weeks on Sept. 11, with the mission of training local forces. Amerine
declined to identify the country, but U.S. Special Forces are known to
have conducted some training for Uzbekistan's armed forces.
Operating in Central Asia and surrounding
countries was the group's specialty. Some members had studied local
languages. Amerine, for instance, speaks Arabic and another member of his
team speaks Persian.
On Sept. 11, someone from the local U.S.
Embassy alerted the team to the events in the United States, and members
watched the BBC broadcast as events unfolded at the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon. The men quickly packed and returned to Kentucky, where an
order soon arrived to head for Afghanistan.
'Sort of a
Wild Card'
"Our mission was to work with Hamid
Karzai, who at the time was sort of a wild card," said Amerine.
"He was our biggest hope for a good Pashtun leader that could really
rally the people and bring legitimacy and change to the government."
First, however, the team deployed to a
country bordering Afghanistan. There members studied intelligence, planned
logistics and worked up a profile of their potential allies. "We need
to have almost like an anthropological background on the people we're
working with in order to work with them properly," said Amerine.
"We need to know the customs to follow."
In military jargon, their field of combat
behind enemy lines is called the "denied area," a place where
soldiers are on their own but can call in help through the lifeline of
communications equipment. "We could go in there naked with flip-flops
and as long as we have good radios we could do our job," Amerine
said.
In mid-October, the Americans flew into
Afghanistan. They landed -- whether by parachute or helicopter, Amerine
wouldn't say -- and Karzai greeted them in the dark in fluent English.
The Americans hastily loaded their
equipment onto a mule train their allies had brought. The Afghans were
clearly amused at the young Americans weighed down with firepower and
communications equipment; Karzai's men, if they had weapons, each carried
a single assault rifle and a few magazines of ammunition.
"We were kind of like newborn babes
trying to get used to the environment, trying to get used to the
people," said Amerine, who is from Honolulu. "We knew we were
among friends, and they were all very warm and receptive."
They trekked through the night for several
hours with the mules. The Americans were at first disconcerted by the
Afghans, who blithely waved flashlights around as they moved across the
difficult terrain. As morning appeared, they entered a village of clay
homes with 60 to 80 families.
"I've got to admit I was almost giddy
because it was . . . like out of a movie," said Amerine, who would
not name the village but said it appeared battered by earlier wars. The
U.S. soldiers were shown to a carpeted room inside a dwelling enclosed by
a large outer wall. The Afghans invited them to sleep and again were
amused when the Americans insisted on patrolling to ensure they were
secure.
The next three weeks were devoted to
planning. "We had to start from scratch to build up a force that was
viable to fight the Taliban," Amerine said. "We began to help
them organize, help them equip themselves . . . getting them arms, getting
them ammunition." The troops also arranged food and blanket drops for
the locals.
Amerine and Karzai also began to size up
each other. "I had to get to know that he was more than just another
politician and he had to get to know what my underlying agenda was,"
Amerine said. "I was real careful in the beginning not to be very
pushy."
Days were spent sitting cross-legged among
tribal leaders who argued fiercely about matters Amerine understood only
through Karzai's translations. "I drank a lot of green tea with Hamid
Karzai during late nights," Amerine said.
Karzai mostly listened before interjecting
firmly but quietly to end the yelling matches. "He was in charge; he
was real soft-spoken," Amerine recalled. "There was never any
need for him to raise his voice. He has a very stately demeanor about
him."
At first, Karzai had a very modest force,
but the village quickly flooded with volunteers arriving day and night.
The U.S. troops conducted some basic training, but the Afghans broke down
along tribal lines and could not be organized into anything approaching
platoons or companies.
"Initially, there was a great deal of
concern about Americans being around," Amerine said. Karzai "was
concerned that some of the locals might be unsettled about Americans being
in their back yard." Over time, those fears subsided.
U.S. officials have said that at about
this time, a U.S. aircraft extracted Karzai from Afghanistan as Taliban
fighters closed in on him. But Amerine's account included nothing about
such a rescue.
Karzai's plan, Amerine said, was to take
the Uruzgan provincial capital of Tarin Kot, which sits 70 miles north of
Kandahar in a valley with four major approaches. "He told me early on
that Tarin Kot was the heart of the Taliban and he said if we could
squeeze the heart of the Taliban and crush it, then the Taliban would be
through," Amerine said. "I thought it would be a long time
before we were ready to take Tarin Kot. . . . He was very confident that
he could just walk into the town and it would be his."
And in the end, that is what happened. The
locals, prompted by some intense diplomacy by Karzai via satellite
telephone, revolted shortly before the Muslim observance of Ramadan began
on Nov. 17. Karzai announced that it was time to move. "We piled on
and had this crazy convoy and drove right into Tarin Kot," Amerine
said. "Every kind of vehicle, soldiers armed to the teeth hanging
on."
Arriving at night on the 17th, Karzai and
the U.S. soldiers moved into the governor's mansion, where a tribal
council was immediately convened.
Taliban
Mounts a Challenge
Soon there was word of a challenge.
"We got a warning that the Taliban had launched a massive group of
people north who had left Kandahar to retake Tarin Kot," said Amerine,
who recalled becoming immediately edgy, particularly because the Afghans
wanted to take time to eat before preparing for battle.
"They forced me to sit and eat a
little bit," said Amerine, recalling a meal of beef stew, bread,
almonds, yellow raisins and more green tea.
With a small group of Afghans, the 5th
Special Forces Group established an observation post outside town as the
Taliban convoy approached early in the morning of the 18th. They called in
U.S. aircraft, which began attacking the vehicles.
"We didn't have a shortage of
aircraft, we had a shortage of vehicles to be bombed by aircraft,"
Amerine said. "If anything, the pilots got disappointed there was
nothing left. It was great listening in on the radio. . . . One of the
[pilots] said: 'We're ready to play, I've got X number of bombs and I'm
looking for some action.'
"They completely mauled that
convoy."
Sgt. 1st Class
Daniel Petithory, 32, of Massachusetts, who later died in the errant
December bombing, directed the air attack. "It's an art,"
Amerine said. "And the guy I had was the best at it I've ever seen.
You need to be able to draw a picture for the aircraft. . . . You're
sitting there with a map. Your knowledge of the area, your ability to use
a map, and your ability to use the right words, to vector the aircraft
into a specific spot -- those are vital to get the aircraft to hit their
targets."
About 10 or 12 Taliban fighters were
captured while maneuvering on the eastern side of the town. They later
revealed that their orders were not only to retake the town but to
slaughter some residents, including women and children, to make an example
of the rebels. "We saved that town," said Amerine, calling it
his proudest moment.
In the aftermath of the assault, the
commander of the Taliban forces, who surrendered a week later, reported
that 300 of his men, mostly Arabs and Pakistanis, were killed in the
counterattack.
"When we turned back that convoy, the
high religious heads came over to Hamid's headquarters . . . and said if
the Americans weren't here, we'd all be dead now," Amerine recalled.
"Basically from that point on, our relationship was solid with the
Pashtun tribes. Hamid told me word spread all the way down to around
Kandahar.
"The impression Hamid had was that
was the Taliban's last-ditch attack," he continued. "We broke
the back of the Taliban that day."
Over the next week and a half, U.S.
aircraft continued to pound Taliban convoys probing the defenses around
Tarin Kot. More and more volunteers poured into the area, giving Karzai a
force thousands strong. "Hamid was arranging for defections and
surrenders all over the place," Amerine said. "As far as I'm
concerned, the greatest tool of the war was his telephone."
The United States dropped more weapons to
the insurgents, although by now Karzai also had a trove of Taliban arms.
On about Dec. 1, the force moved southwest
over two days to the town of De Maymand, where it planned to regroup. The
Taliban kept retreating in front of them without serious engagements.
With the road to Kandahar looking
increasingly clear, Karzai's forces, with U.S. troops at the fore, moved
farther than they had planned, reaching the outskirts of Seyyed Mohammad
Kalay, a town about 30 miles from Kandahar. As the Americans watched, a
dozen or so Afghans charged toward the town, cheering.
Just outside the town was a bridge over a
dry riverbed, one of the last bottlenecks in front of the advance. There,
the Taliban resisted fiercely.
Over two days and nights, the U.S. troops
fought on the ground while U.S. planes dropped bombs south of the river.
"We [started] taking fire, [rocket-propelled grenade] rounds coming
down, machine-gun fire, actually a pretty heavy firefight," Amerine
said. "We pushed forward with my guys, bringing in airstrikes as
necessary. . . . We had guys who had to do some shooting at that
point."
One of the U.S. soldiers was shot in the
shoulder and had to be evacuated by helicopter.
In one of the more bizarre moments of his
six weeks in Afghanistan, Amerine watched a yellow taxicab drive through a
firefight near the targets that U.S. planes were striking. "People
have to go places," Amerine deadpanned.
On the morning of Wednesday, Dec. 5, the
area north of the bridge appeared largely secure, although U.S. planes
were still bombing Taliban positions more than a mile away.
The 10
remaining soldiers from 5th Special Forces Group were feeling good.
"That previous night, especially, we had done a pretty good job of
hammering the Taliban," Amerine said. The soldiers had just received
"care packages" and one soldier -- Master Sgt. Jefferson Donald
Davis, 39, of Tennessee -- had been passing out Rice Krispie treats he had
received from his wife. "One of the nice things was that it was
almost like Christmas for my guys," Amerine said.
On a hill that was crowded with people,
Karzai was expecting a delegation from near Kandahar to discuss another
surrender, and a new group of U.S. soldiers had arrived and was watching
the bombing. In the near distance, across a dry riverbed and an orchard,
was a ridge where Taliban positions were drawing U.S. airstrikes.
In Germany that same day, Afghan political
negotiators were reaching a deal to create an interim government with
Karzai as its leader.
Then "the
bomb came in out of the blue and, you know, nailed us," said Amerine,
who was blown into the air, taking shrapnel and suffering a perforated
eardrum. Killed were Davis, Petithory and Staff Sgt. Brian Cody Prosser,
28, of California, one of the new arrivals. "The Afghanis, they seem
like they took the brunt of it, 'cause there were . . . massive casualties
there," Amerine said.
Karzai, who was in a house at the foot of
the hill, suffered a cut on his face. It was a rare trip to the front for
him because Amerine, whose mission also included protection of this vital
U.S. ally, did not want him near the action. "I wasn't going to give
him the option of coming up front with us," Amerine said. "We
wanted to keep him as safe as possible. . . . Without him, that whole
uprising would have failed."
"I took a time out when I could to go
over and have a good cry a couple of times," Amerine said. "I
was so privileged to have commanded the guys . . . so even amidst the
tears I had to realize that we had done a hell of a lot, and that was
something that I was able to kind of hold on to. . . . It was a horrible
way to end it, but the surrender of Kandahar was coming, my friend was
prime minister of Afghanistan."
© 2001
The Washington Post Company
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